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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Christopher Briggs appeals from the district courfs appellate decision affirming
his judgment of conviction for second degree stalking, arguing that the magistrate court
improperly instructed the jury.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Due to his nonconsensual harassing of Cassandra Menear, the state charged
Briggs with second degree stalking. (R., pp.82-83.) Briggs went to trial. (See Tr.) At
the close of trial, the jury was instructed as to the elements of the crime as follows:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Stalking, the state must
prove each of the following:
1. On or about April 1st, 2009, through June 1st, 2009
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant Christopher Briggs
4. knowingly and maliciously engaged in a course of conduct that
seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed Cassandra Menear,
and was such as would cause a reasonable person substantial
emotional distress, OR
5. engaged in a course of conduct such as would cause a
reasonable person to be in fear of death or physical injury, or in
fear of the death or physical injury of a family member.
If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must find the defendant guilty. If any of the above has not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.

1

(Instruction No.12, R., p.75 (emphasis original).)

The magistrate also offered some

definitions in the jury's instructions as follows:
'Harassed' means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed
at a specific person which seriously alarmed or annoyed the person, and
which served no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must have
been such as would have caused a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress.
'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct composed of a
series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity
of purpose. Course of conduct does not include constitutionally protected
activity.
'Nonconsensual contact' means any contact with the victim that is
initiated or continued without the victim's consent, that is beyond the scope
of the consent provided by the victim, or that is in disregard of the victim's
expressed desire that the contact by avoided or discontinued.
'Nonconsensual contacf' includes, but is not limited to:
1. Following the victim or maintaining surveillance, including by
electronic means, on the victim;
2. Contacting the victim in a public place or on private property;
3. Appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim;
4. Entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or
occupied by the victim;
5. Contacting the victim by telephone or causing the victim's
telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously regardless of
whether a conversation ensues;
6. Sending mail or electronic communications to the victim; or
7. Placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned,
leased or occupied by the victim.
(Instruction No.13, R., p.76.) No party objected to the courfs instructions. (See R.,
p.114; see also Tr., p.169, L.6-p.170, L.10.) After deliberations, the jury returned a
guilty verdict against Briggs. (R., p.59.)
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After dismissing the jury, the magistrate court noted that its definitions instruction
for"course of conducf'did not track the amended statute and expressed its concern that
there was a "decent likelihood that the jury ha[d] been misinstructed in this case:· (See
Tr., p.203, L.14-p.205, L.5.) Briggs moved for a new trial pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 34 and Idaho Code § 19-2406(5), asserting that the magistrate improperly
instructed the jury by omitting "nonconsensual acts' from its definition of "course of
conduct' as it applied to the stalking charge.

(R., pp.90-95.)

The state objected to

Briggs' motion, asserting, inter alia, that because Briggs did not object to the instructions
before the jury retired, he was required to establish fundamental error, which the state
argued he failed to do. (R., pp.99-109.)
After a hearing on the motion (R., p.110), the magistrate denied Briggs' motion,
ruling that any error in the instructions regarding the omission of nonconsensual acts
from the definitions instruction was harmless because nonconsensual acts were both
the exclusive basis for the state's allegations and all the evidence which it presented at
trial (R., pp.113-18). The magistrate entered a judgment of conviction against Briggs
(R., pp.123-24), and Briggs timely appealed to the district court (R., pp.125-28). The

district court upheld the magistrate courfs decision and affirmed the judgment against
Briggs. (R., pp.210-23.) Briggs filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.225-27.)
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ISSUES
Briggs states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the magistrate court improperly instruct and mislead the jury as
to the elements of the crime?
2.
Were the jury instructions so fundamentally flawed to deprive
Briggs of a fair trial without the protections afforded by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of
the Idaho Constitution?
(Appellant's brief, p.10.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Briggs failed to establish fundamental error in the magistrate court's omission of
'honconsensual acts' from the definition of "course of conduct' as that term applies to
second degree stalking, where "nonconsensual acts' were defined in the jury instructions
and the uncontested, overwhelming evidence against Briggs showed that he had
committed nonconsensual acts. Has Briggs therefore failed to show any basis for
reversal of the magistrate's order denying his motion for a new trial?
2.
Briggs failed to raise the issue of fundamental error in the lack of a jury
instruction defining "constitutionally protected activity' to the district court acting as the
intermediate appellate court. Having failed to raise the issue to the intermediate
appellate court, has Briggs waived the issue?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Briggs Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions' Definition Of
Course Of Conduct Entitling Him To Reversal Of The Magistrate's Order Denying His
Motion For A New Trial
A.

Introduction
In its definitions instruction, the magistrate court omitted "nonconsensual acts'

from its definition of "oourse of conduct:' (R., p.76.)

Briggs did not object to the jury

instruction. (See Tr., p.169, L.9-p.170, L.10.) After the jury returned its verdict, Briggs
moved for a mistrial, later recast as a motion for new trial, on the basis that the jury had
been improperly instructed. (Tr., p.205, Ls.20-24; R., pp.90-95.) The magistrate court
denied Briggs' motion, finding that any error in the jury instructions was harmless. (R.,
pp.113-18.)
On appeal, Briggs argues that the omission from the definition constituted
fundamental error and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial.

(Appellanfs brief,

pp.11-17 .) Briggs failed to establish fundamental error because the omission from the
definition, unlike omitting an element of the crime, did not relieve the state of its duty to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the crime; viewed in the
context of the whole jury instructions, it is not clear that the omission would mislead the
jury; and considering the overwhelming and uncontested evidence establishing that
Briggs' actions were nonconsensual, he was not ultimately prejudiced by the omission.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho law permits a new trial if the court misdirected the jury on a matter of law.

I.C. § 19-2406(5). Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the trial court's
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discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. State v.
Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Eddins, 142 Idaho 143,
145, 128 P.3d 960, 962 (Ct. App. 2006).
In this case, the motion for a new trial turned upon the propriety of a jury
instruction. Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654
(2000)).

"An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the

instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a partY:' State v. Shackelford, 150
Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459,
462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)).

C.

Briggs Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In The Magistrate Courfs
Instructions To The Jury

'tt is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal:' State v. Carlson, 134
Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000); see also Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261
P.3d at 865 ('An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal:)
(citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This same
principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) ('No party may
assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to
which the party objects and the grounds of the objection:); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588,
261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only
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review an alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. ~; see also State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Briggs did not object to the magistrate's instructions before the jury retired to
consider its verdict. Thus, to prevail on his motion for a new trial predicated on his claim
of instructional error, Briggs was required to establish that the complained of instruction
rose to the level of fundamental error.

Review under the fundamental error doctrine

required Briggs to demonstrate the error he alleged: "(1) violate[d] one or more of [his]
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exist[ed] (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether
the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless:· Perry, 150
Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Application of this three-prong test to Briggs' claim of
instructional error shows that the district court correctly held that Briggs failed to
demonstrate fundamental error entitling him to a new trial. Briggs has therefore failed to
establish a basis for reversal of the magistrate's order denying his motion for a new trial.
The state charged Briggs with second degree stalking.

(R., pp.82-83.)

magistrate court instructed the jury as to the elements of that crime as follows:
Instruction No. 12: In order for the defendant to be guilty of stalking, the
State must prove each of the following: Number 1...on or about April 1st,
2009 through June 1st, 2009; No. 2, in the state of Idaho; No. 3, the
defendant, Christopher Briggs; No. 4, knowingly and maliciously engaged
in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed
Cassandra Menear and such as would cause a reasonable person
substantial emotional distress, or engaged in a course of conduct such as
would cause a reasonable person to be in fear of death or physical injury
or .. .in fear of the death of [sic] physical injury of a family member. If each
of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find
the defendant guilty. If any of the above has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.
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The

(Tr., p.172, L.11-p.173, L.2; see also Instruction No.12, R., p.75.)
Because jury instructions that relieve the state of its duty to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt all the essential elements of a crime violate a defendanfs right to due
process, jury instructions that omit a contested, essential element of the crime rise to
the level of fundamental error. See Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 (citing
Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004); State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 773, 749,
170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007)). The magistrate's instruction, however, does not omit any of
the crime's essential elements, nor does it relieve the state of its duty to prove those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See I.C. § 18-7906. In fact, Briggs does not
argue that the above elements instruction omits any essential, contested element of the
crime of stalking; nor does he argue that the instruction relieved the state of its
obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime.
Rather, Briggs' argument on appeal is that the magistrate court committed fundamental
error by omitting "nonconsensual contact' from the definition of "course of conduct' in the
magistrate's definitions instruction. (Appellanfs brief, pp.15-17.)
The definitions instruction offered by the magistrate court was as follows:
Instruction No. 13: Harassed means a knowing and willful course
of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarmed or
annoyed the person and which served no legitimate purpose. The course
of conduct must have been such as would have caused a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress.
Course of conduct means a pattern of conduct composed of a
series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity
of purpose. Course of conduct does not include constitutionally protected
activity.
Nonconsensual contact means any contact with the victim that is
initiated or continued without the victim's consent, that is beyond the scope
8

of the consent provided by the victim, or that is in disregard of the victim's
expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued.
Nonconsensual contact includes but is not limited to, No. 1,
following the victim or maintaining surveillance, including by electronic
means on the victim; No. 2, contacting the victim in a public place or on
private property; No. 3, appearing at the workplace or residence of the
victim; No. 4, entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or
occupied by the victim; No. 5, contacting the victim by telephone or
causing the victim's telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously
regardless of whether a conversation ensues; No. 6, sending mail or
electronic communications to the victim; or, number seven, placing an
object on or delivering an object to property owned, leased or occupied by
the victim.
(Tr., p.173, L.3-p.174, L.9; see also Instruction No.13, R., p.76.) Idaho Code§ 187906, however, defines "course of conduct' as follows:
[R]epeated acts of nonconsensual contact involving the victim or a family
or household member of the victim, provided however, that constitutionally
protected activity is not included within the meaning of this definition.
I.C. § 18-7906(2)(a).
The state acknowledges that the magistrate courfs outdated definition for"course
of conduct' omitted the aspect of"nonconsensual contact:' This, however, is not an error
of constitutional dimension: The magistrate courfs omission from the definition did not
omit an essential element of the crime, nor did it alter the state's burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the essential elements of the crime.

Because

Briggs failed to show a violation of an unwaived constitutional right, he failed to
establish fundamental error.
Even assuming some constitutionally significant error, Briggs cannot show that
the error clearly misled the jury as to the elements of the crime or the state's burden of
proof.

First, "nonconsensual contact' was separately defined by the magistrate court,
9

even if omitted from the definition for"course of conduct:' Second, in the context of the
jury instructions and trial record, the term "course of conduct' required "a course of
conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed;' or "would cause a reasonable
person to be in fear of death or physical injury:' (Instruction No.12, R., p.75 (emphasis

added).) As generally understood, actions that cause serious alarm, annoyance, or
harassment, or cause someone to reasonably be in fear of death or injury, already
contemplate a lack of consent. It is well established that jury instructions "may not be
judged in artificial isolation,' but must be considered in the context of the instructions as
a whole and the trial record:' Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting~
v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). Reviewing the instructions as a whole and
considering them in the context of the trial record, Briggs failed to show that the
instructional error he alleged clearly misled the jury into believing that he could be
convicted of second degree stalking based on a course of conduct that was anything
other than nonconsensual. Briggs therefore failed to establish fundamental error.
Finally, even assuming a clear constitutional violation, Briggs is unable to show
prejudice resulting from the magistrate's omission of "nonconsensual contact' from its
definition for "course of conduct:' The evidence that Briggs engaged in nonconsensual
contact was overwhelming. When Ms. Menear broke-up with Briggs she tried to end all
contact with him, keeping her location a secret. (Tr., p.46, L.2-p.47, L.11; p.48, L.6p.49, L.6.) Briggs initially attempted to contact Ms. Menear through texting her friends
and through numerous emails and MySpace messages. (Tr., p.50, Ls.1-8; p.51, Ls.518; p.52, Ls.9-16.) Ms. Menear did not to respond to any of Briggs' messages. (Tr.,
p.52, Ls.17-22.) Briggs then called the residence where Ms. Menear was staying and
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was told by another guest, James Dobson, that '1the owner] doesn't want him calling
there anymore; that they donl like him, that they don't want him around:' (Tr., p.57, Ls.112.) Ignoring that clear refusal of consent, Briggs then drove to the residence and,
shouting outside the trailer, made several threats against James Dobson and Ms.
Menear. (See Tr., p.57, L.23-p.60, L.17.)
Briggs never argued that his attempts to contact Ms. Menear were consensual.
In fact, Briggs acknowledged that James Dobson told him not to contact Ms. Menear.
(Tr., p.141, L.13-p.142, L.4.) Briggs'defense was that he had legitimate purposes for
trying to contact Ms. Menear, such as getting his clothes back, returning her phone, and
trying to pass-on messages. (Tr., p.147, L.20-p.148, L.11; p.151, Ls.1-10). Briggs,
however, never claimed that his contact with Ms. Menear was consensual.
Where an omitted element is ''uncontested and supported by overwhelming
evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error," the
error in the omission of the element is harmless. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17
(1999), quoted in Draper, 151 Idaho at 291-92, 261 P.3d at 868-69; see also Perry, 150
Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. If the omission of an element constitutes harmless error
where it is uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, surely the omission
of a mere definition also constitutes harmless error when uncontested and supported by
overwhelming evidence. Because there was overwhelming evidence of nonconsensual
contact and Briggs never disputed that aspect of the state's case, Briggs failed to show
that he was prejudiced by the magistrate's omission of "nonconsensual contact' from its
definition for "course of conduct' in the jury instructions.
establish fundamental error.
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Briggs therefore failed to

Having failed to establish fundamental error, Briggs has failed to show any basis
for reversal of the magistrate courfs denial of his motion for a new trial. The district
courfs order affirming the magistrate's denial of Brigg's motion for a new trial should
therefore be affirmed.

II.
Because Briggs Failed To Raise The Issue Of Fundamental Error In The Lack Of A Jury
Instruction Defining "Constitutionally Protected Activity' To The Intermediate Appellate
Court, It Is Waived On Appeal

A.

Introduction
Briggs argues that the magistrate court committed fundamental error by not

defining what constituted "constitutionally protected activity' in the jury instructions.
(Appellanfs brief, pp.18-24.) Briggs failed to present this argument to the district court
acting in its intermediate appellate court capacity. Because Briggs failed to present this
argument before the intermediate appellate court, he has waived it. In the alternative,
Briggs' argument appears to be a recasting of Briggs' failed argument presented to the
district court challenging the constitutionality of Idaho Code § 18-7906.

(See R.,

pp.178-84.) Any portions of the argument that were presented to the district court still
fail, however, because they were not preserved before the magistrate court and Briggs
failed to establish fundamental error on appeal.

B.

Any Instructional Challenge Based On The Magistrate Courfs Failure To Define
'Constitutionally Protected Activity' In The Jury Instructions Is Waived
Before a party may assert an issue on appeal, the party is required to seek a

specific ruling on that issue at each stage of the appeal:' Rammell v. Idaho State Dept.
of Agriculture, 147 Idaho 415,421,210 P.3d 523,529 (2009) (superseded on other
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grounds by statute). 'On an appeal from the district court sitting as an intermediate
appellate court, this Court will not consider issues that were not raised before the district
court even if those issues had been raised in the magistrate court:' State v. Doe, 144
Idaho 819, 822, 172 P.3d 1094, 1097 (2007). See also Montgomery v. Montgomery,
147 Idaho 1, 10, 205 P.3d 650, 659 (2009) (This Court will not address an issue not
raised before the district court sitting in its appellate capacity:'); Stonecipher v.
Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731,737,963 P.2d 1168, 1174 (1998) ('It is well settled that an
issue is not preserved for review by this Court even though it was raised before the
magistrate when the issue is not raised later before the district court in the intermediate
appeal:'), quoted in Kraly v. Kraly. 147 Idaho 299, 304, 208 P.3d 281, 286 (2009).
Briggs failed to present to the district court acting in its appellate capacity his
argument that the magistrate court committed fundamental error by not defining
't:onstitutionally protected activity' in the jury instructions. (R., pp.171-84.) Rather, the
only issues Briggs presented to the district court were whether the magistrate court's
error in omitting "nonconsensual contact' from its definition for 't:ourse of conduct'
constituted harmless error, whether Idaho Code § 18-7906 was facially unconstitutional
or unconstitutional as applied to Briggs, and whether there was sufficient evidence to
support Briggs' conviction.

(See R., p.173.) Because Briggs failed to present to the

district court acting in its intermediate appellate capacity the issue he now raises on
appeal, the issue is waived and should not be considered by this Court on appeal.
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C.

Briggs Failed To Preserve His Challenge To The Constitutionality Of Idaho Code
§ 18-7906 In The Trial Court And Briggs Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
On appeal to the district court, Briggs raised a claim that Idaho Code§ 18-7906

was unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to Briggs.

(R., pp.178-84.) Briggs

may attempt to argue that, though altered on appeal to this Court, Briggs' argument is
really just a recasting of this failed argument from below. (Compare R., pp.178-84 with
Appellanfs brief, pp.18-24.) Insofar as Briggs challenges the constitutionality of Idaho
Code § 18-7906, his challenge still fails because he failed to preserve any such
challenge before the magistrate court below and he has failed to establish fundamental
error on appeal.

'An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal:' State v.
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139
Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)). This same principle applies to alleged errors
in jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) ('No party may assign as error the giving of or
failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the
grounds of the objection:); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 P.3d at 865. Absent a timely
objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the
fundamental error doctrine.

!SL

see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d

961,979 (2010).
Review under the fundamental error doctrine required Briggs to demonstrate the
error he alleged: "(1) violate[d] one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2)
plainly exist[ed] (without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
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decision); and (3) was not harmless:' Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Idaho
Code § 18-7906 does not clearly violate an unwaived constitutional right; therefore
Briggs has failed to establish fundamental error.
Briggs asserts that his emails, text messages, MySpace postings, and attempted
contact with Ms. Menear by phone constitute protected speech in the absence of true
threats or intimidation. (Appellanfs brief, pp.23-24.) Briggs fails to recognize that the
unobjected to testimony at trial established that Briggs' messages were threatening (see
Tr., p.49, L.20-p.50, L.14), and thus unprotected speech even under Briggs' proffered
standard.

Furthermore, as noted above, Briggs sent several texts to Ms. Menears

'friends and numerous emails and MySpace messages to her. (Tr., p.50, Ls.1-8; p.51,
Ls.5-18; p.52, Ls.9-16.) Briggs called the residence where Ms. Menear was staying and
was told to stop calling. (Tr., p.57, Ls.1-12.) Briggs then drove to the residence and
yelled several threats at James Dobson and Ms. Menear, causing her to fear for her
safety. (See Tr., p.57, L.23-p.60, L.17.) This conduct, without regard to the content of
Briggs' speech, is clearly prohibited under Idaho Code§ 18-7906 and, contrary to Briggs'
assertions, is not subject to First Amendment protections.
While the First Amendment affords great protections to the content of speech,
those protections are not infringed on by content neutral, narrowly tailored statutes that
merely restrict the time, place, and manner for speech, leaving open other avenues for
expression. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). Idaho Code§ 18-7906
does not seek to police the content of speech, nor does it infringe on the speakers
constitutional rights. Rather, it merely restricts the time, place, and manner of speech in
a narrow, content neutral way, prohibiting engaging '1n a course of conduct' that
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"knowingly and maliciously" seeks to inflict emotional distress, seriously alarm, harass,
or "cause a reasonable person to be in fear of death or physical injury." I.C. § 18-7906.
The conduct that the statute restricts is not constitutionally protected and therefore
application of the statute to Briggs' conduct does not violate any of Briggs' unwaived
constitutional rights. Having failed to show the violation of an unwaived constitutional
right, Briggs has failed to establish fundamental error.
The district court was therefore correct in its holding that the issue Briggs raised
on appeal was unpreserved, and this issue should not be considered on appeal.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Briggs' conviction.

DATED this 27th day of June, 2012.

(R~R
Deputy Attorney General
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